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Introduction
The challenge of fiscal federalism in Bosnia is perhaps unique in the world: The Dayton
talks held in October 1995 immediately after the cease-fire, began with a fully blank slate: "How
would the new nation that emerged as a result of the peace talks be structured from a fiscal
perspective?"  "What would be the role of the central State and what would be that of the two
subnational units (the "Entities") that constituted it?"  "How would the three previously warring
communities of Croats, Bosniacs and Serbs work together to form a central government, what
would the Entity governments look like, and what would be the fiscal functions and rights of
these Entities?" And then, "How would the Entities, in turn, be structured internally, and what
would be their fiscal governance?"
All these questions were open in October 1995, when the international community
worked together with experts and political leaders to forge, for Bosnia, a new constitution, and
the new intergovernmental fiscal system that would be laid out in it.  The new system of fiscal
federalism should, it was agreed, be able to withstand the stresses that would be a natural
consequence of the centrifugal forces still present in the country, be economically sensible, and
yet also obtain the consensus of the three parties who would live with and implement it.  The
purpose of this paper is to describe Bosnia's current arrangements in fiscal federalism, outline the
unique challenges that the Dayton system proposed, and draw some lessons for the design of
fiscal federal systems in ethnically diverse economies.
I. The Dayton Fiscal and Governance Challenge
Under the Dayton-Paris accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is set up as a single
sovereign state composed of two Entities, a Federation (comprised of two major ethnic groups,
and split between a Croat-majority area and a Bosniac-majority area) and the Republika Srpska.
The Federation itself is structured as a three-tier fiscal system -- the Federation, cantons, and
municipalities (see Diagram 1). While most cantons in the Federation are mono-ethnic, there are
two multi-ethnic canLons,  and many multi-ethnic municipalities.  Republika Srpska is a largely
mono-ethnic entity as a result of the war (although this could be partially reversed after the
elections). It has a two-tier structure, comprised of the Republika Srpska and municipalities (see
Diagram I).  Freedom of movement is intended to prevail and right of return is to be respected
under the Dayton Agreements.
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As a result of the war, the unified fiscal system of the old Republic of BiH was broken
up, and until recently there were three totally different fiscal systems in the country -- one in the
Croat-majority area of the Federation, one in the Bosniac-majority area of the Federation and one
in the Republika Srpska.  While all three systems bore the imprint of their Yugoslav origins, the
system in the Croat-majority area, came, over the course of the 4 years following Bosnia and
Herzegovina's declaration of independence, to be harmonized with that of Croatia, while that of
the Republika Srpska became harmonized to that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia --
Serbia/Montenegro. The Croat and Bosniac systems have now begun to be merged, as new
Federation structures are being put in place. Customs structures, the tax administration, customs
levies, excises and several other taxes are now largely harmonized. However, the divergence
between the Federation and the Republika Srpska systems remains significant (Section III).
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Income  and Spending Differences.  There are significant income differences between
ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these differences are reflected in income
differentials between the different parts of the Federation and betveen  the Federation and the
Republika Srpska. Recent (1995) estimates suggest a per capita income of about $500 in the
Bosniac majority area of the Federation (accounting for some 2.5 million of Bosnia's total
population currently in the country of 3.5 million  2), a per capita income of some $1800 in the
Croat areas of the Federation (some 400,000 population) and a per capita income of $1000 in the
Serb area - Republika Srpska (700,000 population). This disparity of per capita incomes suggests
major differences across these areas in terms of tax bases and in taxable capacities, and, absent
equalization policies, in terms of service provision levels.
Even prior to the war in Bosnia, there were differentials in public service levels across the
regions in BiH.  The war, which broke the fiscal structure into three separate systems, has
significantly exacerbated spending differences.  In the Bosniac-majority area, for example, the
pension level was 11.4 DM per month in 1995, while the scheme operating in the Croat-majority
2Bosnia's  total  pre-war  population  was  4.5 million,  of which some  three  million  have  had to leave  their towns  and villages,
with one million  estimated  to be refugees  abroad,  mostly  in Western  Europe. Another  250,000  people  are dead  or missing.
3area paid pensions of about 65 DM per month.  World Bank estimates put the damage from the
war at over $20 billion (World Bank, 1996). However, the destruction of infrastructure and
public utilities, as well as of the capital stock in the productive sectors, hit the Bosniac areas the
hardest, since industry and most core infrastructure facilities had been strategically located in
central Bosnia ever since the early days of Yugoslavia. The tax bases of the Bosniac-majority
area and its ability to generate income have thus been significantly impaired. 3 By contrast, the
Croat-majority area's strategic location near the coast enabled this region to control trade into the
interior of the country during much of the war, and despite its limited resource endowment, to
generate substantial revenues from customs and other trade related levies. The Republika
Srpska's economy has been badly damaged by the embargo, and is expected to recover only
slowly.
A Rolefor  Equalizing Policies?  These differences in taxable capacities and public
service provision levels would suggest, other things equal, that from both an equity and
efficiency perspective, inter-Entity (and intra-Entity, in the case of the Federation) fiscal
equalization policies could have a constructive role to play in the new fiscal system. Such
policies would prevent the large differences in access to fiscal resources currently available to the
subnational Entities and the groups within them from being translated into large differentials in
the supply of public services and infrastructure. 4 From both perspectives, one might be especially
concerned about those public services with major externalities to the nation as a whole, such as
health and education, which are the domain, under the Dayton constitution (see section III) of the
subnational Entities (or the cantons, in the Federation).
Implicit in this view of equity and efficiency is that the relevant domain of concern
(McLure 1994) for efficiency and equity-focused redistribution policies is the nation as a whole -
- i.e., all of Bosnia.  Under such a view, the population of Bosnia sees itself as "Bosnian," instead
of as "Croat," "Bosniac" or "Serb," and supports policies that address inter-regional disparities.
On the other hand, if people's primary allegiance is to the national groups within the Entities,
there will be a more limited view of the domain of concern, and differences in the average
incomes of groups within an Entity or between Entities, or in the average level of public service
provision, may not be the predominant concern of these groups.5
A Strong Role of the Central State? The vast challenge of recovering from the
destruction of war would also suggest that a strong central government, capable of maintaining
macroeconomic stability (see Tanzi; Prud'homme) that creates a "common economic area"
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and mobilizes resources for reconstruction through effective
budgetary and foreign borrowing policies, could also bring substantial benefit.  With the near-
3It could be argued that the concentration of industrial conglomerates, made non-viable due to transition shocks in Bosniac-
majority areas, would have led to some decline in the tax bases of this area even without the war.
41n the short term, this is expected to be donor-financed, but as the economy recovers, a domestic contribution to
infrastructure finance is anticipated.
5McLure (1994) has made these observations about the service provision differentials in the Russian Federation, and the issue
of whether natural resource revenues "belong" to all Russians, or to the territories (oblasts) in which they are located.  The same
observations about preferences and tolerances for redistribution also apply to BiH.
4complete destruction of the productive sectors' capital stock, and a major portion of the country's
infrastructure destroyed, effective use of scarce domestic budgetary resources and foreign flows
could not be more critical.
However, as this paper will suggest, the legacy of war, and the legacy of the
intergovernmental fiscal system in Yugoslavia, make a strong central government difficult. The
State that has been created out of Dayton, far from being empowered and fiscally robust, is one
with no taxing powers of its own, and therefore is dependent totally on the Entities for resources
via "contributions" to the State budget (section III). Its spending authorities are virtually nil.
From a macro perspective, its ability to manage a stabilization policy using fiscal instruments is
highly constrained.  The State's discretionary macroeconomic management tools are limited
further by the fact that the central bank is to be run as a currency board for the next six years. 6
With a weak fiscal authority at the center, the potential for regional equalization is also limited.
And, after the national elections, the State may not borrow abroad or indebt itself, without the
consent of the Entities.  In a nutshell, Dayton set up a "bottom-heavy" system with most
responsibilities and rights in the hands of the Entities.  Clearly, setting up an intergovernmental
system that makes sense, and in this fraught political context, is a major challenge.
II.  The Legacy of Yugoslavia
The legacy of Yugoslavia has significant relevance for the design of Bosnia's
intergovernmental fiscal system; some would say that it is the specter that still hangs over the
design of such policies.  Yugoslavia was always the most decentralized of the socialist
economies, both in terms of its economic and fiscal management and its political structures. The
republics had significant autonomy from the very beginning, unlike in the rest of the socialist
world, and the power of the republics was further increased in the 1963 constitution, creating the
basis for the emergence of centrifugal forces early on. Tax reforms in 1971 gave greater revenue
raising powers to the republics and local authorities, and the 1974 Constitution transferred many
functions to the republics, with "areas of common interest" remaining the responsibility of the
state. These included military expenditures, administration, and economic interventions,
including support to enterprises.
Yugoslavia's six republics were highly differentiated in income level and cultures.
Slovenia was by far the most prosperous, with a per capita income in 1990 of $6,500, with
Croatia the next best-off. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro were considered
the least developed republics. Bosnia's per capita income in 1990 was only 29% of that in
Slovenia (and Macedonia's only  22%).  Further, the level of per capita budget expenditures in
these republics reflected these large income differences.  In the social sectors, for example,
Slovenia's per capita social spending was twice the Yugoslav average, while social spending in
6There  will be a one-time opportunity to issue currency when the currency board is established, from which the State may
accumulate seignorage revenue. However, the revenue is expected to be limited, and cannot be relied upon as a repeating
revenue source. While the possibility of seignorage revenue is intercepted by the establishment of a currency board, the State
may earn some revenue through interest earnings on foreign exchange reserves. In the interim and until a new currency is in
place, the seignorage from the circulation of the deutsche mark in the country accrues to the Bundesbank in Germany (and of the
kuna to the Croatian Central Bank).
5Bosnia and in Macedonia was 70% of the Yugoslavia average (OECD, 1992). These spending
differentials were the result, inter alia, of different initial endowments and incomes, but equally
important, the strong reliance, peculiar to the socialist world, on "derivation-based" systems of
revenue sharing.  Most fiscal revenues were notionally "owned" and retained by the areas in
which they were collected, so that the socialist revenue systems typically benefited those areas
with the more robust tax bases.
Regional Redistribution Policies and Whto  Gainedfrom  Cross-Subsidies? Addressing
the huge regional imbalances in income and expenditures was an objective of Federal policy very
early on.  Federal support to the republics came through two channels: a fiscal channel and a
financial channel.  The fiscal channel had several dimensions. The "Fund for the Development of
the Least Developed Regions," established in 1965, introduced explicit support to the less-
developed regions in Yugoslavia -- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and
Kosovo.7 At its peak, this fund mobilized some 2 percent of GSP -- from the better off regions
who contributed a fixed proportion of their GSP to fund its resources.8 Federal budgetary
resources were also directed to raising the level of social outlays in the poorer republics. The
financial channel operated through the Republic-level commercial banking systems and the
central bank, 9 and contributed both to Yugoslavia's hyperinflation and external indebtedness.
Many attempts have been made to estimate the overall magnitude and net effects of these
fiscal and financial transfers between republics. Vodopivec's (1991) empirical estimate of the net
redistribution among republics of all the subsidies and taxes suggests that the three better off
republics (Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia) were net "taxpayers" and the three less developed
republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro) were significant net
beneficiaries.  Such estimates, however, can only be suggestive at best, given that -- as in much
of the socialist world -- the inter- republic redistributions through the fiscal and financial systems
were, in the end, a series of ad hoc, bargained and very nontransparent agreements, whose effects
and incentives were not at all well understood, and whose very murkiness gave rise to much
dissatisfaction amongst Republics.
Structural  Vulnerabilities.  The better off republics' dissatisfaction with Federal
redistributive policies was compounded by another feature of Yugoslavia's intergovernmental
fiscal system -- the "bottom up" system of intergovernmental revenue flows, which Yugoslavia
shared in common with most other socialist countries, and which still holds in Bosnia and
Herzegovina today (Bird, Ebel and Wallich, 1995). This system conferred a very special
7Kosovo along with Voivodina, which is largely Hungarian-populated, is now a dependent province within Serbia-
Montenegro.
878  percent of Federal Fund resources were mobilized from the three better off republics in the 1970's, falling to 75 percent
in the 1980s (Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia).
9The financial channel was effected in two ways. First, commercial banks in each republic could supplement their deposit
resources by borrowing from their republic branch of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. Empirical studies suggest that the central
bank did play a role in the regional allocation of credit through this mechanism, although it is difficult to get a consistent picture
of who were the gainers and who were the losers. (World Bank, 1989). Second, the commercial banks in each republic financed
the financial losses of enterprises which amounted to 5-6 percent of GSP in the latter part of the 1980's. The inflation (tax) this
process gave rise to was felt by all, but the "benefits" of the system (financing of losses) were concentrated in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia (World Bank, 1989).
6vulnerability on the Federal budget, since all tax revenues were collected at the republic level (or
below) and transferred upwards to the Federal budget in agreed shares (the Federal government
received all of the federal sales tax and all import duties).  In addition, fiscal "contributions" from
the republics, over and above those they made to the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions,
were negotiated annually, to balance the federal government budget.
The Role of Fiscal Factors in the Break-up.  There were many reasons for the breakup of
Yugoslavia, but it would be incorrect to suggest that fiscal, quasi-fiscal and redistributional
factors played no role.  Redistribution policies of this scope were bound to nourish political
separatism, as prosperous republics became more and more reluctant to release and transfer
resources to poorer republics.  The lack of transparency in the system made it possible for each
republic to argue that it bore the costs of the intergovernmental system, while the benefits
accrued to others, so that each thought the others gained, at its expense. Woodward (1995)
argues, compellingly, that the centralizing budgetary and financial policies, designed to give the
central government more control over stabilization policy, supported by the international
community in the late 1980's, further exacerbated such tensions, since they reduced the
budgetary autonomy of the better off republics and empowered the central government, fiscally
and financially, with greater command over resources. The vulnerability conferred by the design
of the system itself finally surfaced, as the three most prosperous republics -- Slovenia, Croatia
and Serbia -- withheld federal tax revenues from the federal budget in 1991. It was with this
history that the partners at Dayton began their work.
Some lessons?  What lessons can be drawn from Yugoslavia's breakup for the creation of
fiscal federalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina? And what lessons would one hope to incorporate into
the new structure that emerged from Dayton?  There would seem to be several that represented
major constraints:
First, because of the Yugoslav legacy, the designers at Dayton had to take into account
the legacy of suspicion of a strong central state and its perceived potential for abuse. This limited
the role that could be given to national-level taxing powers or centralized spending.  Second, the
designers found that the notion of "ownership rights" over revenue collected on one's territory
was hard to overcome -- this was perhaps even more so in the ethnic regions of Bosnia, recently
emerging from war, than in Yugoslavia, where territorial claims to revenues were very strong
indeed. Third, and related, the designers had to contend with a prima facie need, but apparent
virtual intolerance for, fiscal transfers along the lines of the Federal Fund or other cross-subsidies
between areas, and sometimes even within multi-ethnic municipalities.
But, if no other fiscal lesson was learned from the demise of Yugoslavia, the vulnerability
of the Federal fisc to transfers from below was clear to the designers of the new structure. And
yet, the State that emerged had no revenue powers of its own. The vulnerability of the federal fisc
to a decentralized tax administration was similarly evident. And yet, the bottom up system of
revenue administration remained. This reflects the fact that the design on Bosnia's new system
was driven very strongly by the interests of the Entities, whose agreement had to be obtained to
the new structure.
7III. The Dayton Rules
Under the Constitution, major government budgetary responsibilities are divided among
the four levels of government -- the State, the Entities, the Cantons and the municipalities (World
Bank, 1996).
Under the State Constitution, the State government has exclusive responsibility for
foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, immigration, refugee and
asylum policies, air traffic control, payment of international financial obligations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina incurred with the consent of both entities, regulation of inter-Entity transport,
communications, and international and inter-Entity law enforcement (but not the raising of an
army, which is an Entity-level responsibility).  All government functions not explicitly assigned
by the State Constitution to the State are assigned to the Entities (the Entities may agree to
delegate some of their responsibilities upward).  The State government has no independent tax
sources under the constitution (however, the Constitution provides that with the approval of the
State Parliament, the State may levy its own taxes in the future), and is expected to finance its
activities almost entirely from transfers from the two Entities.  Two-thirds of the state's revenues
are to come from the Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska, to cover the budget
approved by the State Parliament.
Under the Federation Constitution (June 1996) the Entity governments have a wide range
of expenditure responsibilities, including exclusive responsibility in their territories over defense
(there are currently three armies:  one in the Republika Srpska, and two in the Federation, one
Bosniac and one Croat), internal affairs, police, environmental policies, economic and social
sector policies, agriculture, industry, refugees and displaced persons, reconstruction programs
and justice, tax, and customs administration.  The constitution provides that some of these
functions may be exercised jointly with the cantons, or separately, or by the Cantons as
coordinated by the Federation Government. Thus, the Federation and cantons exercise joint
responsibility for health, environmental policy, infrastructure for communication and transport,
social welfare, and interior affairs, among others.
The cantons (in the case of the Federation) are responsible for all other matters not
granted expressly to the Federation.  These include education, culture, housing, public services,
local land use, and social transfer expenditures.  Each canton is authorized by the federal
constitution to delegate its responsibilities to the municipalities in its territory.
The municipal governments in the Federation are granted "self-rule on local matters,"
including all responsibilities delegated to them by the cantons. In the case of municipalities with
a majority population that is different from that of the canton as a whole, the canton must
delegate all responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph to the municipal government.
Municipal governments in the Republika Srpska are responsible for all matters not
explicitly the responsibility of the Entity -- and largely parallel the combined responsibility of
cantons and municipalities in the Federation.
8IV.  Can Dayton Work?  Issues and Problems
Can the Dayton Agreements work? More appropriately, is the Dayton structure the best
for Bosnia, and if not, how should the structure be altered?  These are complex questions to
address, particularly since the equity implications associated with government structures, and the
particular importance linked to cross subsidies in BiH, make it very difficult to determine what is
the best system.
The complicated, multi-level government structure arising from the peace arrangements
reflects an ardent aversion to a strong State government that derives from experiences as part of
Yugoslavia. Better off minority groups are particularly concerned that their rights will not be
upheld, and as a result they envision being economically disadvantaged. The fear is that a strong
central government would continue the Yugoslavian tradition of cross subsidies providing
greater benefits to the less well off majority group. The war has further diminished the
willingness of some nationalist groups to view BiH as a single country and to work for the better
of the whole. Creating a government with most expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising
power at the sub-national level was expected to limit the opportunity for transfers to the majority.
The paranoia is sufficiently strong that favoritism of the majority is seen behind every program.
For example, apprehension exists within the Federation that government-run economic
development programs will be designed to support industries that predominate in the majority
areas.
The difficulty of creating governments in this environment can be seen in the relationship
between the Bosniacs and Croats in structuring the Federation.  Croat majority areas favor
relatively strong canton governments and the Bosniac areas favor a relatively stronger
Federation.  The Croats, as the better-off, but minority population, want to continue
decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of government, where ethnicity and incomes are
relatively more homogeneous, and therefore opportunities for cross subsidies are lessened. The
Bosniacs argue for service delivery and revenue collection concentrated in the Federation where
they might better be able to effect cross subsidies. Economies of scale would seem to indicate
that many functions would be better performed at the Federation level given the relatively small
geographic area and population size of the cantons. However, the discussions are heavily driven
by equity and not efficiency.
Less than one year has elapsed, so it is too early to judge fully the Dayton-Paris
Agreements based on actual events.  Still, some general problems can be seen.  First, the tax and
expenditure assignments are imprecise, leaving the potential for disagreements and requiring
difficult political negotiations to reach accords. Even where there is greater precision in the
rules, some of the assignments are inefficient and need to be reconsidered.  Second, little room is
allowed for cross subsidies to exist anywhere in the structure. This means large inequities can be
expected to develop since economic conditions differ widely across the country. Third, most of
the government structures appear potentially sustainable, even if not efficient.  However, the
State's roles are very limited, and its funding sources are precarious.  As a result, the State's
sustainability is in question. Finally, government's size in the economy after the many
transitions is still to be determined.  The remainder of this section provides a detailed
9examination of specific issues in the Dayton rules.
Imprecision of Expenditure Rules.  Despite the appearance of clear guidelines regarding
which government is responsible for delivering which services, the Dayton Rules are confused
and create overlapping responsibilities. Not surprisingly, very different perspectives exist on
what the final outcome should be.  Overlap occurs when the State is charged with one aspect of
service delivery and the Entities with another.  For example, the State is to do "customs policy"
and the Entities "customs administration."  These assignments leave in question which level is to
set tariff rates, which is to determine exemptions, which gets control over the revenues, and a
number of other practical issues. Similar overlap occurs at the Federation and canton levels,
which are assigned joint responsibility for human rights, health, environmental policy,
transportation and communication infrastructure, social welfare policy, immigration and asylum,
tourism and natural resources.
Little is said about municipal responsibilities. The relatively centralized structure already
in place will remain in the Serb Republic.  In the Federation, the issue is what are cantonal versus
municipal responsibilities. Municipalities are granted self rule and also are permitted to perform
functions delegated by the cantons. The probable outcome is a different relative set of duties in
each canton, given their geographic and demographic diversity. Differing patterns of
responsibility will reflect varying sizes, ethnic compositions and political strengths in the
cantons. No problems should arise from assigning provision to different government levels as
long as governments are creative in achieving efficiency in production (see page 20).
A series of other specific problems with the expenditure rules can be identified.  In some
cases there is no clear assignment of functions. Pensions are such an example, though pensions
might be categorized under one of the general functions listed in the Dayton Agreements.  In
other cases, assignments are politically difficult, such as having defense delivered by the
Federation. In a third set of cases, the assignments may be economically inefficient; higher
education being set as a cantonal rather than a Federation responsibility is such an example.
Expenditure responsibilities being imprecise or being assigned to the wrong level of
government does not require the assignments be inefficient, since governments could negotiate
efficient arrangements, such as cooperative service delivery.  However, the recent history of
events in Bosnia make such negotiations particularly difficult, meaning the likelihood is for
economic inefficiencies over the short to medium term.
Expenditure Policy.  The war arrested the transition to a market economy and the
corresponding relative reduction of the public sector. The war years led to ad hoc and very
distorted budgeting and expenditure practices in the Bosniac, Croat, and Serb areas.
Expenditures were heavily focused on military purposes, with about 45 percent of each Entity's
budgeted expenditures going for military uses. Data are unavailable on the total extent of
military expenditures because large off-budget military purchases and spending financed by
foreign governments occurred as well. Budgets for non-military purposes only were provided as
necessary and as resources were available.  Actual expenditures were made essentially on a cash
basis.  Governments made payments when resources were available, and suspended payments
10when they were not.  Pensions and wages -- for military and non-military workers -- often went
unpaid. Actual factor payments bore little relationship to market value.
Expenditure rationalization is an important area for reform. The size of the public sector
needs to be limited to make room for private sector development, and the structure of public
expenditure programs needs to be improved to facilitate growth, while maintaining an acceptable
level of social protection. Public expenditures currently represent more than 40 percent of GDP,
and this, where there are substantial public sector arrears in wages, pensions, military, and debt
service.  Reduction of overall public sector expenditures to sustainable levels as a percentage of
GDP will require major cuts in many areas of public expense; key areas for reduction are
defense, subsidization of the economy, and entitlement programs.  Pension payments cannot be
based on pre-war earnings and expectations, and must be scaled back to a level that is consistent
with reasonable wage tax rates.  (Tax rates are currently in excess of 90 percent on net wages.)  A
rationalization of public expenditure programs will necessarily be required to accompany this
process of downsizing the government, as well as to providing better targeting of public
expenditure.  Highest priority must be given to public expenditures providing a framework that
allows the private sector to flourish -- appropriately selected infrastructure is essential.
Subsidization of outdated, unproductive public enterprises must be given the lowest priority.
Great care must be taken to avoid building large administrative structures in the public
sector -- a potential problem that can be exacerbated by the large number of overlapping
governments.  Early experience evidences a propensity for cantons to overstaff their central
offices with political appointees.  For example, Tuzla Canton already has over 300 employees
performing administrative functions. These practices must be stopped at the canton level and
avoided in all governments. Efforts to rationalize salaries for government employees have
resulted in large percentage salary hikes during 1996, expanding the budgetary size of
administrative staffs.  The raises, mandated by central governments, have placed many cantons
and municipalities in the difficult position of having insufficient resources to finance their
expected salary payments.  As a result, employees in some areas receive raises and in others do
not.
Finance  and Tax Administration.  The Dayton Agreements offer fewer specifics about
financing arrangements after 1996 than about expenditures.  Three general guidelines are given:
the Entities and their constituent governments are given responsibility for finance and tax
administration; the State is to receive two-thirds of its funding from the Federation and one-third
from the Serb Republic; and there is to be a Federation Tax Administration.  All three create
significant issues in practice.
Financing of the State.  The Constitution indicates that the State is to adopt a budget for
the expenditures necessary to finance its responsibilities. No explicit own source revenues are
provided for the State, but the State can generate revenues through charges such as passport fees.
Remaining financing is to be provided two-thirds by the Federation and one-third by the Serb
Republic, a bottom up arrangement, reminiscent of the former Yugoslavia. The State's
sustainability is a concern in this environment, where a strong degree of distrust exists.  No
limitation is placed on State spending, other than that expenditures are to be the ones necessaryto finance its responsibilities.  The financing structure differs from a conventional grant system,
since the recipient is telling the grantor how much to provide.  Disagreement between the State
and the Entities regarding what are necessary expenditures should be expected, and the Entities
are likely to balk at times about paying their share.  Difficulties with funding of the United
Nations may be an appropriate parallel.  Tax rates will need to be higher in the Serb Republic
than in the Federation to generate the respective revenue contributions because of the greater
aggregate population and incomes in the Federation. As a result, pleas of unfairness can be
expected.
The State may be less accountable for spending revenues raised by the Entities. Also,
variability in revenue flows will be borne solely by the Entities, which in principle are unable to
reduce contributions to the State to help lessen effects of unexpectedly low revenues.  There are
two sides to this coin, since Entities do benefit if better than anticipated revenues result.
Federation Finance and Tax Administration.  Tax structures, emanating from the
Yugoslav tradition, are similar in each of the ethnic areas. The Bosniac structure as of November
1995 is given in Table 1. Ownership of tax revenues, control over tax rates and bases, and tax
administration are separable. Division of these, with say the Federation administering taxes that
are owned by both the Federation and cantons, normally is based on conditions that may not be
fully in place at this point.  A level of trust must exist, so that the government owning revenues is
certain that the administering government will transfer the appropriate amounts in a timely
fashion.10 In some cases, local offices of the Russian State Tax Service are passing resources to
the regions and municipalities and giving the Russian Federation government what remains, a
pattern that is the Bosnian concern.  Cantons fear Federation collection will be to their detriment
and the Federation feels the same in reverse.
The owning government also must feel that the administering government will make a
good faith effort to collect revenues. Pressures and incentives in the administering government
may be to focus more of its limited resources on collecting revenues that it can keep, than on
taxes going to other governments. Allowing the administering government to retain part of
revenues as a collection fee can help, but it still gets more revenue benefits from collecting taxes
that it totally retains.
In such a small country, administrative and compliance efficiencies should arise from
Federation (or State) control over most tax rates and bases, since uniform rates and bases will be
more difficult to achieve with devolved control.  However, political incentives can cause
Federation officials to make concessions on tax bases where the revenues are owned by the
cantons.  Granting concessions against another level of government's tax bases offers all of the
same political gains but fewer costs because the concession granting government does not have
to face the budgetary consequences of its actions. Tuzla has already complained that concessions
given to reduce the electric company's wage taxes have significantly reduced Tuzla's receipts.
1 0I'he peculiar Yugoslav institution, the "SDK," the Social Accounting Office, which exists in a somewhat truncated form in
Bosnia and Herzegovina today, makes it possible to pinpoint closely where consumption and employment and production take
place and where taxes should be collected. So far this system has been insufficient to generate confidence in the governments
getting their appropriate shares.
12Again,  willingness  to entrust  control  to another  level of government  requires  a strong  degree  of
trust,  despite  the incentives  and history  creating  a perception  that the trust would  be misplaced.
Separate  tax administrations,  with offices  located  in each municipality,  currently  are
operating  in the Bosniac  and  Croat areas.  A significant  next  step in development  of the
Federation  must  be creation  of a Federation  Tax Administration,  as called  for in the Dayton
Agreement.  Legislation  was recently  passed  establishing  most tax collection  at the Federation
level, but the Tax Administration  has not become  operative  as yet. A director  and  deputy  director
of the tax administration  have  been  appointed,  office  space has been acquired  and  staffing  plans
have  been  developed.
TABLE  I
Tax Structure  for the Republic  of Bosnia  and Herzegovina,  November  1995
Tax  Type of Tax  (Description)  Rates
1. Taxes on Individuals and Corporate Profit
1.1 Taxes on Individuals  Schedular taxes on certain components of
income are supplemented by a further tax
on gross personal income exceeding a
specified threshold.
a)  payroll tax  Withheld by employer  10 percent
b)  farming tax  5-10 percent
c)  self-employment tax  36 percent
d)  tax on income from property  Progressive rates depending
on the type of income
e)  tax on total personal income  Progressive rates, scale from 5
percent to 50 percent
1.2  Republic reconstruction tax  Base is net wages; withheld by employer  10 percent
1.3 Tax on Corporate Profit  The tax is paid by enterprises and other  36 percent
legal entities realizing profit, wilether or
not domiciled in the republic
1.4 Tax on Games of Chance  Tax paid by individuals  15 percent
2. Social Security Contributions
2.1.  Employees
2.1.1  old age insurance  The gross wage is the base for payment  17 percent
of the contribution
2.1.2  health insurance  14 percent
2.1.3  unemployment insurance  2 percent
2.2  Employer
2.2.1  old age insurance  The gross wage is the base for payment  1  7 percenlt
of the contribution
2.2.2  health insurance  14 percent
132.2.3  unemployment insurance  2 percent
3.  Tax on Property
3.1  Tax on Real Estate  Tax paid by legal entities and individuals  15 percent
Transactions  at the time of a real estate transaction
3.2  Gift and Inheritance Tax  Paid on real estate and personal property  0 percent to 12 percent paid
over a certain value  by second degree, third 10
percent more, others 20
percent more
3.3  Motor Vehicle Tax  Tax paid by individuals on vehicles less  1500 dinars per year
than five years old and engine
displacement of 1.6 liters
3.4  Boat Tax  Paid by individuals on boats exceeding 5  900 dinars per year
meters in length
3.5  Sign Tax  Paid by legal entities and individuals on a  DM 50 to DM 250 annually
sign displayed
3.6  Tax on Weekend Cottages  Paid by individuals on the construction  from .10 to I percent on the
value of the structure  value of construction
4. Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services
4.1  Sales Tax on Products  Tax paid on final consumption, but on  5 percent to 20 percent
alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages,
beer, tobacco products, coffee, petroleum
and petroleum products, paid on first sale
4.2  Sales Tax on Services  Paid by legal entities and individuals on  10 percent
services subject to the tax
4.3  Sales Tax on Surcharge  A general surcharge on goods, levied on  10 percent
the sales-tax inclusive price
4.4  Excise Taxes
4.4.1  Tax on Petroleum Products  Paid by the producer or importer per liter  DM .08 to DM .40 depending
on the product
4.4.2  Tobacco Tax  Paid by the producer or importer  DM 0.22 to DM 2.30 per pack
4.4.3  Beer Tax  Paid by the producer or importer  DM 20 to DM 30 per
hectol iter
4.4.4  Alcoholic Beverage Tax  Paid by the producer or importer  DM 8 to DM 10 per liter of
pure alcohol content
4.4.5  Nonalcoholic beverage Tax  Paid by the producer or importer  from DM I to DM 20 per
hectoliter
4.4.6  Tax on Imported  Paid by the legal entity or individual on a  DM 1900 to DM 8000
Automobiles  new imported automobile exceeding
power of 75 KW
4.4.7  Tax on Imported Coffee  Paid per kilogram by the legal entity or  from DM I to DM 4 per kg
individual who brings coffee into the
republic
5. Taxes on International Trade
5.1  Import Duties  from 0 to 21 percent
Source: International Monetary Fund.
14Structural conditions in BiH suggest that grants should be an important financing source
for cantons and municipalities.  One reason is that any assignment of revenue ownership is likely
to lead to both vertical and horizontal imbalances because data for estimating expected tax
collections are poor and the weak economies in some areas will leave them unable to provide
minimum service levels.  Some mechanism, presumably operating through a grant system, needs
to be in place to smooth financing problems during the interim as assignments are finalized and
regional economies rebound.  Also, a system of grants could be used to exploit economies of
scale in tax collection, enhance equity in revenue distribution, and account for geographic
externalities in consumption. However, the very limited tolerance for cross subsidies between
geographic areas suggests that grants must play a small role in overall finance during the near
term.  Unlike transfers made during the Yugoslavian years, any grants that are introduced must
be transparent and rely on objective indicators.  A system of grants based on negotiated formulas
or ad hoc procedures would be particularly inappropriate for Bosnia and Herzegovina, given the
lingering distrust still prevailing among different groups in society.
Debt Policy.  The IMF and World Bank require that their lending be to the internationally
recognized government, which is the State, but no agreement has been reached on how external
debt service is to be financed.  The Constitution says that "Each Entity shall provide all
necessary assistance to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to enable it to honor
the international obligations' l  Like many Dayton rules, implementation of this statement is
unclear.  One possible interpretation is that each Entity is to make contributions according to the
two-thirds Federation, one-third Serb Republic rule.  However, blind adherence to this rule is
likely to generate controversy that could lead to one Entity refusing to pay its share.  At this
point, even getting agreement from the Entities to borrow through the State has been very
difficult.  Determining a means for financing debt service is more complicated.
The Dayton-Paris Agreements allow little flexibility for macroeconomic policy, but the
governments may seek to operate at a deficit, both to ease financing problems and to stimulate
the economy.  Some examples are already apparent.  The original 1996 Republika Srpska budget
assumed a deficit equal to one-third of spending.  The 1996 State budget included authorization
for borrowing and for letters of guarantee.  In practice, the ability to borrow is extremely limited.
The Republika Srpska budget did not pass when it was recognized that there was no means of
financing the deficit. Thus, with the Central Bank operating as a currency board and a weak
banking sector, concerns about deficits may be unimportant in the near term.
Governance During 1996.  The Dayton Agreements were drafted with expectations that
the complete, anticipated government structure would not be operative throughout 1996. In any
event, a transitional period is necessary because time lines in the Agreements were impractical, a
difficulty exacerbated by political problems in getting legislative approval for many facets of the
Agreements.
Revenue assignments in the Federation for 1996 were negotiated between the IMF, the
World Bank and the government.  The State was to receive a share of customs tax revenues.  The
''Constitution  of Bosnia And Herzegovina, Annex 4. Article 1II, Section 2(b).
15Federation was given access to excise taxes and the share of customs taxes not passed to the
State. Other taxes in the Federation were to go to the cantons.
To date, the State has performed minimal operations, in as much as broad based
acceptance of the State's role was hampered in the pre-election period. The presidency was
elected on September 14, 1996, but the government has yet to be formed.  The State budget is a
relatively small DM 61.4 million for 1996, and is mostly used for wages to operate Ministries
and set up costs for providing diplomatic functions and issuing documents.  The State has been
receiving about 30 percent of customs tax revenues from the Federation, but there has been
considerable controversy over how much it should get. The Republika Srpska is not contributing
to State finance in 1996. The structures of the new State government was formed 12 weeks after
the elections of September 14, 1996, but its members have not yet been identified, as of early
December 1996. It is expected that the State budget and other macro institutions will be
established following the appointment of this new Council of Ministers.
The Republika Srpska government structure was not altered by the agreements, so no
transition has been necessary. However, the initial budget proposed by the Ministry of Finance
was 50 percent above expected revenues. The Parliament sent the budget back for adjustment,
and the government has been operating under an interim budget.  Spending was limited to
available funding during the first three quarters, and revenues are running about 15 percent below
estimates. The Serb Republic had an explicit deficit equal to about one percent of GDP in 1995,
and a payment to cover some of the 1995 shortfall is included in the 1996 budget. The majority
of revenues are collected at the Entity level, and shares of the revenue are transferred to finance
municipal functions.  Banja Luka has argued strongly that for political reasons it is receiving less
than its legislated share of taxes.
The Federation has not begun to operate as a full fledged government.  Ministries have
been formed and Ministers and some staff appointed, but only the Federation Customs Bureau is
fully operative. A combined payments bureau has just begun to function. Most responsibilities
are still being performed by the former governments in the Bosniac and Croat majority areas, or
by cantons and municipalities.  Tax revenues continue to be collected by the former Bosniac and
Croat governments, with some of the revenues being transferred to the Cantons and
municipalities.  The Federation has been receiving customs and excise tax revenues since May.
By the end of September, the Federation had received income of DM 183.9 million and had
expended DM 173.4 million.  Only DM 13.0 million has gone for salaries and materials.
All 10 cantons had been formed by the time a law establishing their geographic
boundaries was passed in June.  However, most of the cantons have elected a legislature and
president, and are establishing a working framework that includes constitutions.  Only the
cantons including Tuzla, Zenica, and Bihac can be described as functioning.  Organization of
these three was well underway before peace, in part because these regions were cut off from
Sarajevo during the war and had, de facto, to set up their own institutions.
16V.  Options for the Future
It is difficult to be fully prescriptive about the best government structure for a country
where so much transition is under way.  The complexity of making such prescriptions is
exacerbated by the recent history, that includes being part of Yugoslavia and participating in the
war, and by the various agreements that already have been made.  Still, a series of
recommendations that would enhance the public sector's operational efficiency can be made.
Shifting Functions to the State.  A number of functions could be managed much more
effectively at the State than at the Entity level.  The Entities would be well served to identify
where efficiency gains are likely, and to seek agreement to transfer the functions to the State.
Examples are administration of value added (should one be legislated) and enterprise profits
taxes and of customs administration.  The Entities could delegate the functions to the State, but
both Entities would need to agree. Three conditions need to be in place for delegation to occur:
(1) significant efficiency gains must result, (2) transfer must be Pareto Optimal and (3) there
must be reasonable security that the agreements will not be violated.  Nonetheless, political
discord, fears that agreements will not be adhered to, and envy could lead the Entities to reject
efficient delegation.
Coordination Between the Entities.  Open borders that allow the free movement of
goods and services and permit the economy to expand are a requirement of the Dayton
agreements, but oblige the Entities to coordinate in setting tax administration and policy.  For
example, a value added tax cannot be easily imposed at a sub-national level without internal
borders, but the borders would violate the Dayton agreements.  Even a tax or boundary check
between the Serb Republic and the Federation is inconsistent with rapid economic growth, and
creates ample opportunity for abuse.  One form of abuse would be imposing a recording fee at
the checkpoint that could quickly be escalated to effectively become a customs duty.  The
potential for abuse is equally large for customs administration.  Close coordination must
substitute for borders to ease administration of these taxes, unless administration is delegated to
the State.
Given the open economy (even at the borders with Croatia and Yugoslavia), the broad tax
policy of each Entity also must be carefully coordinated.  Differentials between areas in
customs, consumption, and capital tax rates1 3 provide significant opportunities for tax avoidance
and evasion and will result in concentration of imports, production and sales in the lowest tax
areas.'4 The best way to limit tax competition and the resulting resource migration is for the
Entities to set tax rates on mobile factors, consumption, and customs within a small range of each
other. The compensation could be informal, based simply on observing the other Entity's tax
policies, or explicitly, through negotiations. More efficient tax policy is likely to result from
explicit cooperation, but today there is no mechanism in place where the dialogue can occur.
Coordination between the Serb Republic and Yugoslavia and between the Federation and Croatia is already well underway.
13The  Dayton Agreements can be interpreted as requiring common customs tax rates, but the Entities are free to set the other
tax rates,
14Labor migration in response to tax differentials is not a significant issue in the current environment, given the absence of
freedom of movement across entities.
17Size of Government.  Government must be reduced substantially to a size that is
appropriate for facilitating the private sector's operation, providing a sustainable, reasonable
safety net, and ensuring delivery of services that are essential to an acceptable quality of life.
The multi-layer government structure raises the challenge of attaining a smaller size while
achieving public sector goals, but emphasizes the importance of being vigilant in seeking
efficiency in government.
In recent years, budget control has been exercised by limiting spending to available
revenues, with no expectation that planned expenditures were to be financed.  Budgetary
practices need to be rationalized to where expenditures are set to meet appropriate goals, with the
expectation that all expenditures, including wages and pensions, normally will be met.
Rationalization of spending will require that expenditures for defense, the safety net, and
subsidization of the economy will be reduced.
In addition, the budget cannot be expanded to accommodate arrears.  A number of
outstanding claims on BiH arise from frozen foreign exchange deposits and unpaid pensions and
wages.  The total value of these claims is more than DM 13 billion in the Federation, or about 10
years of current own source revenues.  Recently, foreign exchange bank books worth nearly DM
5 billion were issued allowing former Republic of BiH soldiers to make explicit claims against
the Republic.  The recognition of explicit claims on a case by case basis must be curtailed, and
previous decrees and laws repudiated. It is essential that any settlement of these liabilities occur
using revenues from the sale of assets (such as could arise from flats and enterprise privatization)
and that no mechanism for settling liabilities have implications for the budgets of the State,
Entities, cantons or municipalities.  Political and equity based concerns will be the key factors in
deciding the relative compensation paid for these claims.'5
Budgetary savings can be obtained through more efficient operations.  First, better
delivery mechanisms must be identified. Diseconomies of small scale must be overcome
through creative means of consolidating certain functions. The State or inter-entity cooperation
should be used wherever significant efficiency gains are possible.  Similarly, cantonal or
municipal cooperation could allow the scale necessary to efficiently deliver certain services.
Health care, higher and secondary education, transportation, and environmental services are
obvious areas for cooperation. Privatization of service delivery is an option that permits both the
benefits of private sector incentives and the capacity to expand the geographic area for service
provision.
Second, public sector employment must be scaled down to acceptable levels.  In certain
circumstances public employment can be a stopgap for job shortages, but it cannot serve as a
long term strategy for job creation or as the safety net.  Public sector employment must be
determined by the number necessary to efficiently deliver services. It is essential that
administrative staffs be streamlined, and every service be examined for potential areas to reduce.
Assigning Expenditure  Functions in the Federation.  Four criteria are used for
'5These claims do not include the international debt of BiH.
18recommending the optimal assignment of public functions between the Federation, cantons, and
municipalities: (1) the potential for economies of scale, (2) the existence of interregional
spillovers, (3) variation in preferences, and (4) the desire for equalization and tolerance for cross-
subsidies.  A recommended assignment of functions within the Federation (and in some cases
including the State) based on the tradeoffs among these criteria is shown in Table 2. The
Federation should be responsible for areas mainly with Federation-wide impacts.  The
Constitution has already assigned several functions to the Federation, including defense, federal
police, justice, and customs administration.  It would be reasonable to assign additional functions
to the Federation, including university education, some medical care, intercanton transport,
environmental control, and part of social welfare. Cantons and municipalities will have
responsibility for many functions including much of health care, education, housing, fire
protection, and utility services. Despite the substantial responsibilities assigned to cantons and
municipalities, Federation expenditures are a significant share of total (see Table 5 below).
Agreements should be reached between cantons and their constituent municipalities
regarding the specific sharing of responsibilities. The Constitution requires that municipalities
that are predominantly composed of a minority population in the canton be permitted to deliver
services locally. A key problem is determining the revenues, that otherwise would go to the
canton, that are to flow with the expenditures.  Minority municipalities must receive a revenue
allocation that legitimately allows them to meet their service responsibilities, without creating
unreasonable fiscal strain on local citizens. Careful design of the revenue arrangements is
important because Ethnic problems often arise locally and frequently can be solved if much of
the power for decision making is local (Tishkov, 1993). Cantons could devise transfer schemes
that make it very difficult for minority municipalities to finance service delivery, which could
lead to strong disagreements.
Tax Assignment  in the Federation.  As a rule, canton and municipal revenues should be
based on a combination of assigned revenue instruments and grants, with the goal of ensuring
vertical balance -- meaning that each level of government would have sufficient revenue capacity
to fund the services for which it is responsible. Furthermore, tax and grant assignments must be
made with an eye on both the funding of current service levels as well as future service needs.
That is, revenue buoyancy must be carefully considered when assignments are made. Each level
of government -- the Federation, cantons, and municipalities -- must have sufficiently buoyant
revenue sources to provide the revenues needed to pay for the delivery of services over time.
19TABLE 2
Recommended Assignment Of Public Functions
Service Category  Type of Service  Level of Government
Heath Care:  Primary  Municipality
Secondary (e.g., hospitals, curative)  Canton
Tertiary (infectious disease, research)  Entity
Education:  Primary  Municipality
Secondary  Cantonal/Municipality
University  Entity
Transportation:  Roads/Highways (intracity)  Municipality
Roads/Highways (intercity)  Canton/Entity/State
Airports  Entity
Public Transportation:  Intracity  Municipality
Public Transportation:  Intercity  Entity
Private Transportation, Taxis  Canton/Municipality
International  State
Environmental  Air/Water Pollution  Canton
Water/Forestry  Entity/State
Housing  ALL  Canton
Solid Waste, Water, Sewer, Fire  ALL  Municipality/Canton
Land Use/Zoning  ALL  Municipality
Licensing/Regulation  ALL  Canton
Cultural Policy  ALL  Canton
Tourism  ALL  Canton
Social Welfare  ALL  Canton/Entity
Telecommunications  ALL  Entity/State
As noted above, it is important to differentiate among the separate steps of the taxation
process when making tax assignments. These steps include tax administration; definition of tax
bases; setting of tax rates; and tax ownership.  The level of government in charge of collecting a
tax need not be the same level that defined the tax base, set the tax rate, or owns the tax revenues.
Locally owned taxes (cantonal or municipal taxes) need not be locally administered, and
federally imposed and collected taxes can be-- and, in other countries often are-- shared with
other levels. Alternatively, taxes could be collected at the canton level and shared with the
Federation.  In fact, it is recommended that for the most important taxes, definition of the tax
base and possibly setting of the tax rate be done at the Federation (and ultimately State) level,
while allowing cantons and municipalities some flexibility over revenue instruments.  Economic
integration, tax compliance, and tax administration would be greatly enhanced by nationally
uniform bases and rates for customs, excise, corporate and personal income, and sales or value-
added taxes. However, cantons must be protected from the Federation exempting taxpayers or
narrowing the base for taxes where the Federation has little or no revenues at stake. A proposed
set of assignments for the Federation is in Table 3.
20Three criteria must be weighed in determining the appropriate tax ownership
assignments. First, tax assignment must bear a strong correspondence to the expenditure
responsibilities of each government level to ensure that adequate financing is available to deliver
required services. A perfect relationship between expenditure responsibilities and tax revenue
ownership is not required, and probably is not desirable, because grants can be made from a
government that owns revenues to assist another government in financing its expenditure
responsibilities. Second, tax assignment must not violate the Constitution, Dayton Pacts and
other international agreements.  Third, tax ownership must be consistent with the administrative
ability to measure where the taxable activity occurs, if revenues are to be distributed on a sites of
collection basis. For example, ownership of customs taxes based on where the imports are
consumed is administratively impractical at the municipal or canton level.
The Federation needs to take a number of important steps before tax ownership can be
determined precisely and implemented effectively. Expenditure assignments must be structured
before final tax assignments can be made. Also, the full set of Federation tax laws need to be
legislated and enforced. A mix of laws from the Federation and old Croat and Bosniac areas
currently are being enforced on the Federation side.
Tax assignments that would result in vertical balance given expected 1997 expenditure
assignments were estimated (see Tables 4 and 5). 6  The assignments assume that no
intergovernmental transfers occur, other than those implicit in the assignments.  The State needs
to receive 7.4 percent of Federation and 17.3 percent of Serb Republic customs tax revenues to
finance its expenditures.  The difference in shares illustrates the effect of having one-third of the
State financed by the Serb Republic and the other two-thirds financed by the Federation.  No
other detail was estimated for the Serb Republic.
In the Federation, the remainder of customs taxes and excise, special import and
enterprise profits taxes are assigned to the Federation.  Wage income and profits taxes are
assumed to be split evenly between the Federation and the cantons.17 The cantons and
municipalities receive the range of smaller taxes including the real estate, judicial and advertising
taxes. The sales tax is assigned as a shared tax, with 64.5 percent going to the Federation and the
rest to the cantons and municipalities.
16Revenues  and expenditures were estimated separately.  Expenditure requirements were based on budgeted and actual 1996
expenditures and assumed growth rates for the State and Federation.  Additional transfers to the State are necessary if the State is
to remit debt amortization payments. Canton and municipal expenditures were estimated using actual 1995 expenditures for the
various services, and assumed growth rates.  Revenue estimates for 1997 are based on actual collections in 1995, the first nine
months of 1996, and assumed growth rates.  No attempt is made to estimate revenues separately for municipalities versus
cantons in the Federation.  Defense, social programs and debt service are used to balance expenditures and revenues and do not
include off-budget expenditures.
'7The split wage tax could be designed as a piggybacked wage tax, as has been proposed by the IMF.
21TABLE 3
Summary  of Suggested Tax Assignments
Tax Type  Tax  Tax Base  Tax Rate  Revenue Ownership
Administration
1. Customs  Federal or State  Federal or State  Federal or State  Federation and State
2. Excises  Federal level  Federal legislation  Federal legislation; surcharges set  Federation.  Cantons or
by cantonal or municipal  municipalities may
assemblies.  impose retail level
taxes.
3. Wage and  Federal level or  Federal legislation  Basic rate set by the Federal  Shared by the
Persona  canton level  legislation; surcharges set at the  Federation, cantons,
Income.  cantonal level.  and municipalities.
4. Corporate  Federal level  Federal legislation  Federal legislation  Federation.
Income
5. Sales Tax--  Federal level;  Federal legislation  Rates to be set by the Federation  Federation, cantons and
Retail Level  feasible but  legislation; surcharges can be set  municipalities
complicated at  by cantons.
the cantonal
level
6. Property Tax  Municipal level  Federal legislative  Municipal level  Municipal level
framework
7. Real Estate  Municipal level  Federal legislative  Municipal assemblies  Municipal level
Transfers  background
8. Motor Vehicles  Municipal level  Federal legislative  Cantonal level  Cantons and
framework  municipalities
9. Social Security  Federal level  Federal legislation  Federal legislation  Funds
Contributions
10. User Fees.  Service  Cantonal legislation  Cantonal or municipal providers  Service providing
Social Services  providing  agencies
agencies
11. User Fees.  Service supply  Regulatory  Service providing companies  Service providing
Utilities.  companies  Frameworks  subject to regulatory oversight  companies
12. VAT  Federal level  Federal legislation  Rates to be set by the Federation  Shared between the
legislation  Federation and the
cantons.
*  Tax assignments  are  suggested  between  the State  and Federation  Government. The  tax assignments  between  the State  and Republika  Srpska
Entity could be  similarly aligned.
22TABLE  4
1997 Tax  Revenue  Assignments  Federation
Federation Revenue Distribution
(Percent)
Revenues  State  Federation  Cantons  Total (%)
Customs Duties  7.4  92.6  0.0  100.0
Excise & Special Import Taxes  0.0  100.0  0.0  100.0
Wage & Income Taxes  0.0  50.0  50.0  100.0
Profits Tax  0.0  50.0  50.0  100.0
Sales Tax  0.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Other Taxes  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0
Total Revenues  1.3  40.0  58.7  100.0
The revenue assignments were proposed to create vertical balance in the system, but
several important cautions should be noted. First, the assignments will allow horizontal
imbalances at the canton and municipal levels.  Estimates suggest several cantons would have
significant deficits, arising both from the expenditure and revenue sides.  Revenues are
constrained in some areas because of very weak economies and expenditure needs are larger in
some places than others.  Second, the expenditure assignments used here are similar to those in
place for 1996, except most spending for health, education, and police services are passed to the
cantons. Changes in the expenditure assignments will necessitate changes in revenue
assignments. Third, very minimal grants from the Federation to the cantons are allowed for in
the financing scheme.  Own source revenues should be the major financing source because of
accountability, concerns about cross subsidies, differences in service demands, and other reasons.
Still, a greater role for grants exists, and development of a transfer system would require
additional tax assignment to the Federation.  Finally, the assignments fail to recognize
differences in revenue buoyancy, and will have to be altered over time if expenditures grow at
different rates than revenues. Sub-national governments often are assigned taxes with low
buoyancy. However, about 60 percent of the revenues assigned here are from the relatively
buoyant sales and wage taxes.
Most taxes, including the corporate and personal income, excise, customs, and value
added taxes would be best administered at the Entity level, and in several cases at the State level.
A limited number of revenue sources, such as the property tax and user fees, could be
administered at the sub-Entity level. Taxes are administered at the Entity level in the Republika
Srpska, and legislation has been passed for administration at the Federation level as well.
Advantages in terms of lower operational costs, coordination of administration, and uniform
practices all argue strongly in favor of the Federation.  The key is to design an administrative and
revenue distribution system that safeguards the cantons and municipalities so that they will be
willing to accept Federation administration.
23TABLE 5
1997 Tax Revenue Distribution Bosnia and Herzegovina
Total Revenue Distribution (Mil. DEM)  T otal
(Mil. DEM)
Revenues  State  RS  Federation  Cantonis
Customs Duties  25.00  39.70  208.30  0.00  273.00
Excise & Special Import Taxes  0.00  0.00  173.00  0.00  225.00
Wage & Income Taxes  0.00  60.00  20.00  20.00  100.00
Profits Tax  0.00  0.00  70.00  70.00  140.00
Sales Tax  0.00  78.00  0.00  500.00  578.00
Other Taxes and Fees  15.00  21.00  0.00  179.00  215.00
Total Revenues  40.00  198.70  523.30  769.00  1,531.00
Expenditures
Expenditures (Except Army,  40.00  116.70  163.30  769.00  1,089.00
Social Prog. & Debt Serv.)
Expenditures: Army, Social  0.00  82.00  360.00  0.00  442.00
Programs & Debt Service
Total Expenditures  40.00  198.7  523.3  769.00  1,531.00
The Federation and RS data do not include special funds for health care, unemployment, and pensions.  The RS data
do not include municipal revenues.
Conclusion
Progress in developing the governments in Bosnia has been slower than was envisioned
when the Dayton Agreements were penned.  This is not surprising since there is little or no world
experience with developing governments on the short time line presumed in the Agreements.
There are positive signals in Bosnia, such as a number of government institutions becoming
operative and revenues being passed to both the State and the Federation.  Still, the challenge of
achieving fully operational governments remains in place.
Traditional economic models of federalism, like the one on which this paper's  analysis is
based, suggest a government structure assuming there is an intent to achieve Pareto-efficiency for
the entire country.  Current attitudes in Bosnia appear consistent with the views that many people
in each ethnic group see themselves as members of their group, rather than as Bosnians, and are
not broadly concerned about welfare of the entire country or access to public services outside the
group. The motivation for the fiscal federalism structure proposed in the Dayton Agreements is
24better interpreted as an effort to manage conflict between the ethnic groups.  Federalism in a
conflict management sense does not require that each group be given its own state, but does lead
to the conclusion that institutions of power should be brought closer to people so that decision
making can be more sensitive to the different ethnic groups (Tishkov, 1993). Decentralization in
this context is a means to lessen the points where disagreement exists, rather than a structure to
obtain economic efficiency. Common institutions at the State, Entity or canton levels are
maintained, but only for functions that must be broader in scope.  The fiscal (and other)
interdependencies from common institutions at the State. Entity. and canton levels provide
opportunities to build relationships and trust over time.
The government structure included in Dayton is workable. However, unless governments
negotiate other arrangements, the likely outcome in the short to medium term is diseconomies of
scale in provision of certain services, as some that can be provided at lower unit costs at the State
level are provided at the Entity level, and some with lower unit costs at the Entity level are
delivered at the canton or municipal level.  Services with geographic spillovers will be
underprovided because governments will fail to adequately account for the benefits received by
members of other ethnic groups.  Further, little consideration will be afforded to equity between
groups. resulting in widely different access to services across the country.  Better service delivery
mechanisms from a national, Pareto-efficient perspective will not be selected given the very
strong distaste for cross subsidies and the fear by minority groups that they will be dominated by
a larger group.  More efficient arrangements can be expected to evolve over time as confidence
in the government structures grows.
Horizontal imbalances will be large in the Federation, and grants will be used to a very
limited extent to offset these imbalances.  The resulting problems will be lessened in the next
several years to the extent the former Bosniac or Croat governments are able to provide some
resources to the more financially strapped areas or the donors help fund infrastructure and other
needs.  But donors will not finance operating expenditures, and maintenance of new
infrastructure investments will place greater demands on limited budgets, so financial problems
in the places least able to pay could expand. Economic growth that increases revenue raising
capacities across Bosnia is one solution to offsetting imbalances. Also, differences in access to
services could be lessened with a system that allocates more grants to places with the greatest
expenditure needs and with the least revenue capacity.
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